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Pursuing The Well Pled Federal Civil Racketeering Complaint In The Eleventh Circuit Court Of Appeals

An article by Joe Pappacoda, JD, Senior Litigation Paralegal, GhostWriter Paralegal, Chartered

I. Pleading Requirements/Standards To Withstand A Motion To Dismiss:

A Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim is reviewed de novo. Simpson v. Sanderson Farms, Inc., 744 F.3d 702, 705 (11th Cir. 2014).

The 11th CTA must deem all allegations in a complaint as true, and construe them in the light most favorable to the plaintiffs, at the motion to dismiss stage of a case. Ironworkers Local Union 68 v. AstraZeneca Pharm., LP, 634 F.3d 1352, 1359 (11th Cir. 2011). To survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss for failure to state a cause of action, a complaint must plead “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). The 11th Circuit Court Of Appeals is however, free to affirm a district court’s dismissal on “any ground that is supported by the record.” United States v. Elmes, 532 F.3d 1138, 1142 (11th Cir. 2008).

Civil RICO claims must also meet specificity requirements (pleading particularity of fraud) of Rule 9 (b) Fed. R. Civ. P., which the 11th Circuit opined may be harder to meet than the elements of a well pled RICO complaint. Bryan Ray v. Spirit Airlines, No. 15-13792 (11th CTA, September 2, 2016), n. 2.

II. Well Pled Elements Of Civil RICO For Filing A Civil RICO Case:

Congress enacted RICO in 1970, prohibiting racketeering activity connected to interstate commerce. Ray, 767 F.3d at 1224. The statute makes it “unlawful for any person employed by or associated with any enterprise engaged in, or the activities of which affect, interstate or foreign commerce, to conduct or participate, directly or indirectly, in the conduct of such enterprise’s affairs through a pattern of racketeering activity or collection of unlawful debt.” 18 U.S.C. § 1962(c). In addition to creating criminal penalties for racketeering activities, the statute also created a private, civil cause of action. Thus, “[a]ny person injured in his business or property by reason of a violation of section 1962 of this chapter may sue therefor in any appropriate United States district court and shall recover threefold the damages he sustains and the cost of the suit, including a reasonable attorney’s fee . . . .” 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c).

1.) General RICO Elements:

“To recover, a civil plaintiff must establish that a defendant (1) operated or managed (2) an enterprise (3) through a pattern (4) of racketeering activity that included at least two racketeering acts.” Bryan Ray, 767 F.3d at 1224.

2.) Business Injury:

A civil plaintiff must also show “(1) the requisite injury to ‘business or property,’ and (2) that such injury was ‘by reason of’ the substantive RICO violation.” Williams v. Mohawk Indus., Inc., 465 F.3d 1277, 1282–83 (11th Cir. 2006), abrogated on other grounds as recognized in Simpson, 744 F.3d at 714–15.

“The upshot is that RICO provides a private right of action for treble damages to any person injured in his business or property by reason of the conduct of a qualifying enterprise’s affairs through a pattern of acts indictable as mail fraud.” Bridge v. Phoenix Bond & Indem. Co., 553 U.S. 639, 647 (2008).

3.) RICO Liberal Construction:

Although initially enacted to fight organized crime, the Supreme Court has rejected a reading of RICO that applies only where the pattern of conduct is “characteristic either of organized crime in the traditional sense, or of an organized-crime-type perpetrator, that is, of an association dedicated to the repeated commission of criminal offenses.” H.J. Inc. v. N.W. Bell Tel. Co., 492 U.S. 229, 243 (1989). So limited a reading of the statute, the Supreme Court has concluded, is unsupported by the text or legislative history of RICO. Id. at 244. To the contrary, “the RICO statute provides that its terms are to be liberally construed to effectuate its remedial purposes.” Boyle v. United States, 556 U.S. 938, 944 (2009) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., 473 U.S. 479, 497–98 (1985).

4.) Business Injury Must Be Tied To Fraudulent Conduct:

The Supreme Court has been clear that a party is only entitled to recover under RICO “to the extent that [plaintiff] he has been injured in his business or property by the conduct constituting the violation.” Sedima, 473 U.S. at 496. Thus, a defendant who commits an act of racketeering is “not liable for treble damages to everyone he might have injured by other conduct, nor is the defendant liable to those who have not been injured.” Id. at 496–97 (quoting Haroco, Inc. v. Am. Nat’l Bank & Trust Co. of Chicago, 747 F.2d 384, 398 (7th Cir. 1984)).

5.) But For And Proximate Causation Must Be Plead With Specificity:

Rather, pleading a civil RICO claim requires that plaintiffs plead facts sufficient to give rise to a reasonable inference that the claimed racketeering activity through mail and wire fraud -- was the but-for and proximate cause of the plaintiffs’ injuries. See Simpson, 744 F.3d at 712; Williams v. Mohawk Indust., 465 F. 3d 1277, 1287 (11th Cir. 2006)(detailed analysis of civil RICO elements).

“It is by now clear that to state a prima facie civil RICO claim under 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c), a plaintiff must establish “three essential elements”: first, that the defendant committed a pattern of RICO predicate acts under 18 U.S.C. § 1962; second, that the plaintiff suffered injury to business or property; and, finally, that the defendant's racketeering activity proximately caused the injury. Avirgan v. Hull, 932 F.2d 1572, 1577 (11th Cir.1991); see Holmes v. Secs. Investor Prot. Corp., 503 U.S. 258, 265–68, 112 S.Ct. 1311, 117 L.Ed.2d 532 (1992).” Simpson v. Sanderson Farms, F. 3d 702, 705 (11th Cir. 2014)

6.) RICO Proximate Cause:

The connection between the racketeering activity and the injury can be neither remote, purely contingent, nor indirect. See Anza v. Ideal Steel Supply Corp., 547 U.S. 451, 457 (2006); Williams, 465 F.3d at 1287–88. “When a court evaluates a RICO claim for proximate causation, the central question it must ask is whether the alleged violation led directly to the plaintiff’s injuries.” Anza, 547 U.S. at 461; see also Williams, 465 F.3d at 1287. The injurious conduct need not be the sole cause of the plaintiffs’ injuries, but there must be “some direct relation” between the conduct and the injury to sustain a claim. Williams, 465 F.3d at 1287–88 (quoting Anza, 547 U.S. at 457). Notably, the fact that an injury is reasonably foreseeable is not sufficient to establish proximate cause in a RICO action -- the injury must be direct. Hemi Grp., LLC v. City of New York, 559 U.S. 1, 12 (2010) (plurality opinion); Williams, 465 F.3d at 1291.

7.) Reliance And Manifestation Of Reliance:

The 11th Circuit has previously held that plaintiffs did not adequately plead a RICO claim where their complaint asserted only the bald conclusion that the plaintiffs relied on a misrepresentation without showing how that reliance was manifested. Ambrosia Coal & Constr. Co. v. Pages Morales, 482 F.3d 1309, 1317 & n.12 (11th Cir. 2007).

Moreover, the 11th Circuit has held that plaintiffs lack standing to bring a RICO claim unless their injuries were proximately caused by the RICO violation. Bivens Gardens Office Bldg., Inc. v. Barnett Banks of Florida, Inc., 140 F.3d 898, 906 (11th Cir. 1998) (citing Pelletier v. Zweifel, 921 F.2d 1465, 1499 (11th Cir. 1991), abrogated on other grounds by Bridge, 553 U.S. 639).

An allegation amounts to little more than a “[t]hread bare recital ..[that cites] .. elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements,” is plainly insufficient to support a cause of action for civil RICO. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678; cf. Ambrosia Coal, 482 F.3d at 1317 & n.12. The mere fact of having been misled does not ineluctably give rise to a RICO cause of action unless the act of misleading the plaintiffs actually caused them injury in their business or to their property that they would not otherwise have suffered. Id.

8.) No Need To Rely Personally So Long As Someone Else Did Rely:

To be sure, RICO does not contain a requirement that the plaintiff personally relied on the defendant’s fraudulent misrepresentation. Bridge, 553 U.S. at 648– 49. In Bridge, the Supreme Court recognized a civil RICO claim where the defendants had submitted fraudulent documents to Cook County, Illinois, which was conducting property auctions, thereby giving the defendants an unfair advantage over the plaintiffs in securing property at those auctions. Id. at 642–44. The Court ruled that the plaintiffs could proceed with the lawsuit even though it was Cook County, and not the plaintiffs, that had relied on the misrepresentations. But the Court was clear that its holding dismissing the need for first-party reliance on the fraud did not mean that a party can prevail without showing that someone had relied on the fraud. Id. at 658. Without reliance on the fraud by someone -- in Bridge, Cook County -- the plaintiffs would not be able to show that they were injured by reason of the alleged racketeering activity. And a showing of direct injury is required to sustain a RICO claim. Unable to establish even but-for causation, such a plaintiff necessarily would be unable to meet the higher burden of showing that the racketeering activity proximately caused the plaintiff’s injuries. See Holmes v. Sec. Inv’r Prot. Corp., 503 U.S. 258, 268 (1992); Williams, 465 F.3d at 1287.

9.) No Reliance Requirement For Wire Fraud Based On Material Omissions:

The 11th Circuit Court Of Appeals decision in Kemp v. AT&T, 393 F.3d 1354, 1361 (11th Cir. 2004), held that where the allegations of mail or wire fraud involve omissions rather than affirmative misrepresentations, no reliance is necessary. But this does not excuse a plaintiff from adequately pleading proximate cause in their RICO claim. The discussion in Kemp revolved around a challenge to whether AT&T had committed the predicate racketeering acts of mail and wire fraud. Id. at 1359–61. The 11th Circuit Court Of Appeals found that a plaintiff does not have to prove reliance on a fraudulent omission of material information to sustain a claim for mail or wire fraud. Id. at 1361. But finding that a defendant committed a predicate racketeering offense, such as mail or wire fraud, is not the same as finding that it committed a RICO violation. Civil RICO plaintiffs must sufficiently plead both racketeering activity and that the activity caused them some injury. “This is true even when a criminal conviction for the underlying racketeering activity would not require a showing of actual injury, as is the case with mail and wire fraud.” Beck v. Prupis, 162 F.3d 1090, 1095 (11th Cir. 1998); see also Pelletier, 921 F.2d at 1499.

III. Well Pled civil RICO Enterprise:

1.) Shared Common Purpose:

A well pled Florida civil RICO Complaint must plead the existence of a RICO enterprise and a common purpose shared by members of the enterprise. According to the RICO statute, an “‘enterprise’ includes any individual, partnership, corporation, association, or other legal entity, and any union or group of individuals associated-in-fact although not a legal entity.” 18 U.S.C. § 1961(4).

2.) Association-In-Fact Enterprise:

The Supreme Court has instructed us that an association-in-fact enterprise must possess three qualities: “a purpose, relationships among those associated with the enterprise, and longevity sufficient to permit these associates to pursue the enterprise’s purpose.” Boyle, 556 U.S. at 946. It is “simply a continuing unit that functions with a common purpose.” Id. at 948. An enterprise need not have a hierarchical structure, specific governing procedures, or fixed roles for its members. Id. at 948. What is required is “evidence of an ongoing organization, formal or informal, and . . . evidence that the various associates function as a continuing unit.” United States v. Turkette, 452 U.S. 576, 583 (1981).

An associated-in-fact enterprise is “a group of persons associated together for a common purpose of engaging in a course of conduct.” United States v. Turkette, 452 U.S. 576, 583 (1981). While “the very concept of an association in fact is expansive,” the Supreme Court has nevertheless found that an association-in-fact enterprise must have three “structural features”: (1) a “purpose,” (2) “relationships among those associated with the enterprise,” and (3) “longevity sufficient to permit these associates to pursue the enterprise’s purpose.” Boyle v. United States, 556 U.S. 938, 944, 946 (2009). As a result, an associated-in-fact enterprise can be either “formal or informal,” as long as the enterprise’s “various associates function as a continuing unit.” Turkette, 452 U.S. at 583; see also United States v. Goldin Indus., Inc., 219 F.3d 1271, 1275 (11th Cir. 2000) (explaining that how “loose or informal” an enterprise is makes no difference, as long as the enterprise “furnishes a vehicle” for the racketeering activity). Almanza et al v. United Airlines et al, No. 16-11048 (11th CTA, March 13, 2017).

3.) Will Turn On Relationships:

If this association-in-fact enterprise does not have sufficient relationships among Defendants as associates [of the RICO enterprise], it lacks the structure needed to be legally cognizable. Proving sufficient relationships for an associated-in-fact enterprise is not a particularly demanding task, but the endeavor can be elusive. For example, an associated-in-fact enterprise “need not have a hierarchical structure or a ‘chain of command,’” and its “decisions may be made on an ad hoc basis and by any number of methods—by majority vote, consensus, a show of strength, etc.” Boyle, 556 U.S. at 948. The enterprise does not have to give its members fixed roles, nor does it need to have “a name, regular meetings, dues, established rules and regulations, disciplinary procedures, or induction or initiation ceremonies.” Id. Nevertheless, “the group must function as a continuing unit.” Id. citing Boyle v. United States, 556 U.S. 938, 944, 946 (2009).

To show that Defendants acted as a continuing unit, some plaintiffs try unsuccessfully to show that defendants entered into some agreement, either express or tacit. But since many plaintiffs do not allege facts showing that this alleged agreement actually exists, their allegations simply recite a legal conclusion—the ‘existence of an agreement’ which is inadequate for pleading purposes. See Bell Atl Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 564 (2007)(“Although in form a few stray statements speak directly of agreement, on fair reading these are merely legal conclusions . . . .” Id. citing Boyle v. United States, 556 U.S. 938, 944, 946 (2009).

4.) Existence Of Parallel Conduct Supporting Implied Agreement By Enterprise:

Parallel conduct standing alone cannot support a plausible inference of an agreement. In Twombly, the Supreme Court rejected as inadequate the conclusory allegation of a conspiratorial agreement, despite the fact that the allegation was coupled with allegations of parallel conduct. Parallel conduct [of Enterprise associates], the Court explained, can just as easily indicate “independent action” as it can collusion. See Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556-57. To cross the line from a possible to a plausible existence of an agreement, plaintiffs must allege a “further circumstance pointing toward a meeting of the minds.” Id. at 557. Without that “further factual enhancement,” “an account of a defendant’s commercial efforts stays in neutral territory.” Id.

An appellate court will look to whether a filed civil RICO complaint alleges facts sufficient to give rise to a plausible inference that the various members of the alleged enterprise acted with a common purpose. Bryan Ray v. Spirit Airlines, No. 15-13792 (11th CTA, September 2, 2016) citing Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678.

5.) Separation Between Defendant Entity And Enterprise Entity:

An association-in-fact enterprise and defendant corporation must be distinct for RICO purposes from the defendant corporations officers, agents, and employees, when those individuals are operating in their official capacities for the corporation, regardless of whether those activities are within the scope of their employment. Significantly, to state a civil RICO claim, a plaintiff must establish a distinction between the defendant “person” [in total] and the “enterprise” itself. The Supreme Court has made it crystal clear that the racketeering enterprise and the defendant must be two separate entities. Cedric Kushner Promotions, Ltd. v. King, 533 U.S. 158, 161–62 (2001); see also United States v. Goldin Indus., Inc., 219 F.3d 1268, 1271 (11th Cir. 2000) (en banc) (“We now agree with our sister circuits that, for the purposes of 18 U.S.C. § 1962(c), the indictment must name a RICO person distinct from the RICO enterprise.”). This requirement arises from the statutory language making it “unlawful for any person employed by or associated with any enterprise” to engage in racketeering activities through that enterprise. 18 U.S.C. § 1962(c). It does not make sense for a person to employ or associate with himself. Thus, an enterprise may not simply be a “‘person’ referred to by a different name.” Cedric Kushner Promotions, 533 U.S. at 161.

6.) Closely Held Corporation Exception:

The Supreme Court has held that, where the defendant is a natural person, he is distinct for RICO purposes from a closely held corporation of which he is the president and sole shareholder. Cedric Kushner Promotions, 533 U.S. at 160. That case involved allegations that the boxing promoter Don King conducted the affairs of Don King Productions (a corporation of which he was the president and sole shareholder) through a pattern of racketeering activities consisting of fraud and other RICO predicate crimes. Id. at 160–61. The Court started its analysis with the premise that a corporation and its owner/employee are legally separate and distinct entities. Id. at 163. Moreover, RICO was designed to protect legitimate enterprises from becoming vehicles through which unlawful activities are committed. Id. at 164. “A corporate employee who conducts the corporation’s affairs through an unlawful RICO pattern of activity uses that corporation as a vehicle whether he is, or is not, its sole owner.” Id. at 164–65. Thus, RICO’s distinctiveness requirement is met where an individual defendant engages in a pattern of racketeering activity through a corporation, even a corporation of which the defendant is the sole shareholder. Id. at 166. But the Court’s holding went no further. Indeed, the Court explicitly disclaimed deciding the “quite different” issue, arising in Cedric Kushner, where the defendant “person” is a corporation and is alleged to have engaged in an enterprise with its officers, employees, and agents. Cedric Kushner Promotions, 533 U.S. at 164.

In a federal civil RICO case, where a corporation is the defendant person, and the corporation, together with its officers, agents, and employees, are said to constitute the [entire] enterprise, the case will fail for failure to properly plead a RICO enterprise. Every circuit that has squarely decided this matter has recognized this distinction. See Cruz v. FXDirectDealer, LLC, 720 F.3d 115, 121 (2d Cir. 2013); Fitzgerald v. Chrysler Corp., 116 F.3d 225, 226–28 (7th Cir. 1997); Riverwoods Chappaqua Corp. v. Marine Midland Bank, N.A., 30 F.3d 339, 343–44 (2d Cir. 1994); Bd. of Cty. Comm’rs of San Juan Cty. v. Liberty Grp., 965 F.2d 879, 886 (10th Cir. 1992).

The 11th Circuit specifically agreed with other sister circuits on this matter. Thus, for example, the Second Circuit has ruled on this issue at least twice. First, in Riverwoods, the court rejected allegations of a RICO enterprise consisting of a defendant corporation and three of the corporation’s vice presidents. Riverwoods, 30 F.3d at 343–45. The Second Circuit held that because a corporation can only act through its employees and agents, the fact that it does so is insufficient to establish the existence of an enterprise. Id. at 344. Likewise, in Cruz, the Second Circuit rejected claims of a RICO enterprise consisting of a defendant corporation, its parent company, a former equity stakeholder, the CEO, the managing director and corporate counsel, and various software companies that assisted the corporation in developing its technological platform. Cruz, 720 F.3d at 120–21. The court rejected the RICO claims as to the corporate officers, because a defendant corporation cannot form a RICO enterprise with its own employees or agents who are carrying on the normal work of the corporation. Id. at 121. The former stakeholder and software companies were deemed incapable of being part of the enterprise because there was no pleading that they were aware of the allegedly fraudulent activities of the corporation and, therefore, could not have been working toward the common purpose of committing fraud. Id. Finally, the corporation was held not to be able to form an enterprise with its parent company where they shared a single, unified corporate structure. Id. The Tenth Circuit has also declined to find a RICO enterprise where a corporate defendant was accused of acting through its employees and agents. Liberty Grp., 965 F.2d at 886. There, the alleged enterprise consisted of a corporation, the corporation’s general partners (both legal entities in their own right), the corporation’s successor in interest, a corporate officer, and a corporate employee. Id. at 881. The Tenth Circuit held that these individuals and entities lacked the requisite distinctiveness to form a RICO enterprise. Id. at 886. Finally, the Seventh Circuit in Fitzgerald affirmed the dismissal of a RICO claim against the Chrysler Corporation where the alleged enterprise consisted of the corporation, subsidiaries of the corporation, franchised Chrysler dealers, and trusts controlled by the corporation. Fitzgerald, 116 F.3d at 226. The Seventh Circuit concluded that the various parties to the alleged enterprise were either part of the same corporation or else they served a role that could have been filled directly by the corporate employees so that it made no sense to treat them as distinct entities for RICO purposes. Fitzgerald v. Chrysler Corp., 116 F.3d 225, 228 (7th Cir. 1997).

In sum, the 11th Circuit now holds too that a civil RICO plaintiff may not plead the existence of a RICO enterprise between a corporate defendant and its agents or employees acting within the scope of their roles for the corporation, because a corporation necessarily acts through its agents and employees. Bryan Ray, et al. v. Spirit Airlines, Inc., No. 15-13792, (11th Cir. September 2, 2016) (See Riverwoods, 30 F.3d at 344; Liberty Grp., 965 F.2d at 886.

5.) Taking Over Otherwise Legitimate Firms:

RICO was designed -- at least in part -- to prevent an individual engaged in racketeering activities from increasing his power to do wrong by taking over an apparently legitimate firm. Fitzgerald, 116 F.3d at 227. Doing so allows that individual to “use[] the firm’s resources, contacts, facilities, and appearance of legitimacy to perpetrate more, and less easily discovered, criminal acts than he could do in his own person.” Id.

Finally, while RICO was intended to be interpreted broadly, permitting plaintiffs to plead an enterprise consisting of a defendant corporation and its officers, agents, and employees acting within the scope of their employment would broaden RICO beyond any reasonable constraints. See Cruz, 720 F.3d at 121; Riverwoods, 30 F.3d at 344. Because every corporation acts through its own employees as a matter of course, allowing such pleadings to go forward would turn every claim of corporate fraud into a RICO violation. Fitzgerald, 116 F.3d at 226. No matter how broadly RICO is interpreted, there is no reason to think that Congress intended the law to provide treble damages in every conceivable case of corporate fraud. Id. This article is for informational and educational purposes only and should not be construed as constituting legal advice. In fact it is not legal advice and was written by a non-attorney and was intended as a recitation of Eleventh Circuit and Florida case law quoted. You should consult with your attorney to determine the best course of action to take on your case.

Copyright 2018 All Right Reserved, by Joseph J. Pappacoda, JD, Senior Litigation Paralegal, GhostWriter Paralegal, Chartered, Fort Lauderdale, Florida

RICO Cases Cited Above:

1. Almanza et al v. United Airlines et al, No. 16-11048 (11th CTA, March 13, 2017); 2. Ambrosia Coal & Constr. Co. v. Pages Morales, 482 F.3d 1309, 1317 & n.12 (11th Cir. 2007); 3. Anza v. Ideal Steel Supply Corp., 547 U.S. 451, 457 (2006); 4. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009); cf. Ambrosia Coal, 482 F.3d at 1317 & n.12; 5. Beck v. Prupis, 162 F.3d 1090, 1095 (11th Cir. 1998); citing Pelletier, 921 F.2d at 1499; 6. Bell Atl Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007); 7. Bivens Gardens Office Bldg., Inc. v. Barnett Banks.., 140 F.3d 898, 906 (11th Cir. 1998); 8. Boyle v. United States, 556 U.S. 938, 944 (2009); 9. Bridge v. Phoenix Bond & Indem. Co., 553 U.S. 639, 647-649 (2008); 10. Bryan Ray v. Spirit Airlines, No. 15-13792 (11th CTA, September 2, 2016); 11. Bryan Ray v. Spirit Airlines, 767 F. 3d 1220 (11th Cir. 2014); 12. Cedric Kushner Promotions, Ltd. v. King, 533 U.S. 158, 161–62 (2001); 13. Fitzgerald v. Chrysler Corp., 116 F.3d 225, 226-228 (7th Cir. 1997); 14. Haroco, Inc. v. Am. Nat’l Bank & Trust Co. of Chicago, 747 F.2d 384, 398 (7th Cir. 1984); 15. Hemi Grp., LLC v. City of New York, 559 U.S. 1, 12 (2010) (plurality opinion); 16. H.J. Inc. v. N.W. Bell Tel. Co., 492 U.S. 229, 243 (1989); 17. Holmes v. Sec. Inv’r Prot. Corp., 503 U.S. 258, 268 (1992); 18. Kemp v. AT&T, 393 F.3d 1354, 1361 (11th Cir. 2004); 19. Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., 473 U.S. 479, 497-498 (1985); 20. United States v. Goldin Indus., Inc., 219 F.3d 1268, 1271-1275 (11th Cir. 2000); 21. United States v. Turkette, 452 U.S. 576, 583 (1981); 22. Williams v. Mohawk Indus., Inc., 465 F.3d 1277, 1282-1283 (11th Cir. 2006); 23. Simpson v. Sanderson Farms, Inc., 744 F. 3d 702 (11th Cir. 2014). This article is for informational and educational purposes only and should not be construed as constituting legal advice. In fact it is not legal advice and was written by a non-attorney and was intended as a recitation of Eleventh Circuit and Florida case law quoted. You should consult with your attorney to determine the best course of action to take on your case.

Copyright 2018 All Right Reserved, by Joseph J. Pappacoda, JD, Senior Litigation Paralegal, GhostWriter Paralegal, Chartered, Fort Lauderdale, Florida